Kant’s Critique of Prudence and the Internal Divergence of German Conservatism: Rehberg, Gentz, and the Limits of a Priori Right

Abstract

The debates in Germany during the 1790s surrounding the French Revolution went beyond a mere political event and became a profound philosophical interrogation of the limits of political reason. Kant’s 1793 essay On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice responded to conservative critics who prioritized historical practice over rational principles. While Kant subsumed these critics under the concept of Klugheit (prudence) and rejected it through the salto mortale argument, this paper argues that he thereby obscured a crucial distinction between two conservative positions: Rehberg’s substitution model (experience replaces a priori principles as the source of normative content) and Gentz’s supplementation model (experience provides the necessary conditions for realizing a priori principles). By reconstructing the debate and tracing the shifting terminology across Kant, Rehberg, and Gentz, this paper reveals a normative-structural difference that Kant’s unified verdict concealed. The analysis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the Kantian legacy in early German conservatism.