A Game Theoretic Study of Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of RJR Nabisco Being Acquired by KKR

Yanqing Jiang, Jian Yuan, Mengmeng Zeng


There are both macro- and micro-level studies concerning enterprise mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Past studies have focused on M&A valuation, utility of the M&A motives and the strategic behavior during of the M&A process. Few game theory methods in the application of M&A stay mostly in the analysis of Nash equilibrium under the complete information static game. This paper thus aims to analyze the M&A behavior of enterprises within the framework of incomplete information dynamic game, combined with sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of complete information dynamic game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium of incomplete information.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.11114/bms.v2i2.1552


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Business and Management Studies     ISSN 2374-5916 (Print)     ISSN 2374-5924 (Online)

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