Influence of Power Game between Major Shareholders and CEO on Company Risk-taking ——Empirical Data from China's Securities Market

Xiaoyu Hu, Qun Wang


Based on the theory of behavioural economics, this study starts from the cognitive behaviour and the power game of the major shareholders and CEO to explore the high risk taking of the company brought by irrational decision-making behaviours such as “overconfidence” and “loss avoidance” due to the high concentration of managers' power and major shareholders’ power. Furthermore, the empirical tests show that domination of either the major shareholders or CEO will have a significant positive effect on the company's operational risk. However, the greater power from both parties will inevitably result in power game, and its resulting checks and balances have a significant adjustment effect on the company's risk taking.

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Applied Economics and Finance    ISSN 2332-7294 (Print)   ISSN 2332-7308 (Online)

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