

Media Consumption of Youth in the Border Regions of Kazakhstan and Its Impact on National Identity

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Abstract

National identity of youth is an important part of social identity in general and is formed at the intersection of personal and public factors. The nature and structure of youth media consumption in the border regions differs from the situation in the central and remote regions of the countries. In such regions, the content of local media can be directly or indirectly linked to neighboring states, which contributes to the emergence of cultural and information transformations. This is especially acute in the context of geopolitical and cultural changes, such as armed conflicts, migration flows and other global processes.

Based on the analysis of scientific literature, this article examines the goals, strategies and methods of foreign propaganda using the example of Russian case. Through a survey of 565 young individuals from the North Kazakhstan, Kostanay, and Pavlodar regions, this research examines how does media consumption in border regions affect youth perception of their national identity and political views. The survey results indicate that a significant portion of respondents engage with Russian media and social networks, with 27% trusting foreign news sources. The study also highlights a potential crisis of identity, as reflected in the respondents' ambiguous political views on sensitive issues.

Keywords: media consumption, national identity, border regions, youth, Kazakhstan

1. Introduction

National identity is considered as a dynamic perception of oneself in the context of history, culture, and politics, which is actively formed, including through media platforms (Citrin et al., 2001). In the context of globalization and the growth of transnational media, the influence of foreign sources of information on internal processes is increasing. In the border regions of the countries, young people are usually influenced by media content of both domestic and foreign origin. According to the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2024), as of September 2024, 5,584 domestic and 301 foreign media outlets were officially registered in Kazakhstan. At the same time, online portals are not included in these statistics due to their free distribution over the Internet without using traditional communication channels such as television or radio channels.

This influence is especially strong in border areas, where access to media from neighboring countries can be easier and more active. Understanding how media consumption affects the national identity of young people is of great importance for shaping public policy in the field of culture, education, and media. Particularly it allows to track the image of a particular state within the country, which affects the political and economic processes in society.

Let's consider this in the case of the internal impact of Chinese state media on the national identity of Chinese youth. They used virtual idols of a certain character and appearance to promote mainstream culture among Chinese youth and influence the youth identity of virtual idols' fans (Song et al., 2024).

A study conducted in Saudi Arabia examines the impact of social media content on the national identity of university students (Al-Saify et al., 2024). The content of social networks is able not only to set up young people to perceive themselves as part of a large team, but also to encourage social activity in the form of volunteering and promoting national history, symbols, and values. In another study, Ithemere (2024) identified a relationship between the language of

consumed media and national identity among Mauritius secondary school and university students. Thus, a decrease in the consumption of content in their native language has changed the identity of the surveyed youth.

However, other studies conducted in the context of media globalization show that exposure to foreign media often leads to identity problems, especially in regions with strong cultural influence of neighboring countries. For example, Slamgazhy et al. (2024) have identified a trend towards more positive and neutral coverage of China in Kazakhstani news outlets. Alexander et al. (2005) have established the relationship between the social identity of the Lebanese and their perception of the United States. Frangville et al. (2023) conclude that in the digital world, the expression of national identity can not only be positive, but also acquire structural features of aggressiveness and alienation. Using the example of the studied cases, the authors argue that the states of Northeast Asia use the cultural capital of youth as a “soft power” in foreign policy to influence the national identity of young people in other countries. Roberts and Ziemer (2024), analyzing statistics and real facts, concludes that Russia is economically, politically, and socially trying to influence the countries of the former USSR.

The purpose of our research is to study the media consumption of young people in border regions and assess its impact on their national identity.

Research objectives: to identify the types and sources of media consumed by Kazakhstani youth in border regions, to analyze the correlation between media consumption and perception of national identity.

Research question: How is the media consumption of young people in the border regions formed? How does the media consumption of young people in the border regions affect their national identity?

Hypothesis: The youth of the border regions consume a large amount of foreign content, which undermines their national identity and forms belonging to a foreign country.

2. Literature Review

There are many cases in history when the media has been used as a propaganda weapon, shaping national views in accordance with the goals of the propagandists. For example, the Franco dictatorship in Spain (1939-1975) used newsreels and documentaries to spread national-syndicalist and national-Catholic values (Delgado-Granados & De-Las-heras-monastero, 2024). Salazar’s dictatorship in Portugal spread nationalist ideas not only through bulletins and newspapers, relying on propaganda among children through education (Gondim & da Silva, 2024).

Propaganda through the media was also used during the Second World War. It was part of Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa and used collaboration strategies. The Soviet press created an idealized picture of the people’s unity in the fight against the fascist invaders, erasing references to the allied states (Rudling et al., 2024).

Modern propaganda is characterized by technology and new approaches. The results of Alyukov’s research (2021) demonstrate that authoritarian regimes broadcast propaganda narratives in traditional media reinforcing this with similar content in digital media. Later, Alyukov et al. (2023) calls this phenomenon ‘network authoritarianism’, when the government builds an ecosystem of digital propaganda, including bot accounts and paid agents of influence. Thus, the number of materials supporting the war in Ukraine artificially increases in digital media, which helps propagandists influence public perception of this topic.

Researchers Lebed & Morgulev (2024) analyzed Soviet and Russian postage stamps, as well as studied television news and talk shows from 2019-2020, and note a high level of propaganda content in them. They were aimed at gaining public approval of the impending war. It proved the validity of The Rubicon Theory of War, when people began to be proud of their national identity and acquire an excessive sense of self-confidence, while dehumanizing the enemy (Johnson & Tierney, 2011).

In another study, Shirikov (2024) describes the relationship between identity-consistent messages and their impact on mass media trust. As a result, citizens who support the regime have more confidence in state media reports than independent ones, however, state media lose trust if they publish more critical reports. Scientist Ammon Cheskin (2014), investigating a similar problem in the Baltic countries, pays special attention to the study of the national identity components among Russian-speaking community living in these countries and the related concepts of ‘external homelands’, ‘nationalizing states’ and ‘international organizations’.

Other researchers have studied the influence of Russophobia statements by foreign media on the self-identification of Russian-speaking citizens living in Latvia. The results of the study demonstrate that these media, despite propaganda efforts, do not occupy a leading position in the respondents’ media consumption. It was revealed that the older generation perceives propaganda narratives more deeply, but this has little effect on the level of national identity, only increasing dissatisfaction with the political regime of the host countries (Hoyle, Powel, et al., 2024).

The nature of propaganda narratives is easy to explain, based on the research of David Bourguignon et al. (2006). In

particular, the researchers argue that discriminatory propaganda narratives can positively influence the self-esteem of a discriminated audience. Because the discriminated audience feels less alone in their plight, thereby alleviating the harmful effects of discrimination.

A similar approach to the propaganda of radical Islam was used by preachers of the 'Islamic State' banned in many countries. Due to the growth of publications about radical islamism in the European media, Muslims living there fell for the propaganda narratives of the 'Islamic State' aimed at protecting religious identity, and so gradually became involved in the ranks of extremists (Awan, 2024).

The content of propaganda narratives was studied by scientists Hoyle, Wagnsson, et al. (2023). They subdivide strategies for the emotional impact of propaganda materials into destruction (emphasis on crime and unresolved social problems) and suppression (ridiculing the liberal values of countries). Through an experiment, scientists have identified a model of the impact of these strategies used by foreign media on residents of Sweden and the Netherlands. The influence of news narratives on the emotional state of readers was also studied in the example of the topic about the consequences of increased immigration in Spain (Igartua et al., 2011).

Thus, we can conclude that the emotional state that directly affects the audience's sense of national identity directly depends on the narratives broadcast in the media and social media content. This relationship will increase as the consumption of information content has become a part of modern human life. According to Datareportal (2024), the average person in the world uses social media for 2 hours and 23 minutes daily.

3. Methodology

In a previous study, we considered the influence of Kazakh-language media content on the national identity of young people in Kazakhstan (Petrov et al., 2023). Thus, we found that the lack of content in the Kazakh language reduces the motivation to study it, creates a sense of inferiority among the Kazakh-speaking population, which negatively affects their national identity. Scientists Yessenbekova et al. (2024), who studied the demand for television content in the national language on the example of Kazakhstan, came to similar conclusions later.

In this study, we decided to study the impact of content in a foreign language on national identity using the example of young people in the border regions of Kazakhstan. In this case, the Russian-speaking regions chose, because the Russia-Ukraine War has caused an identity crisis in many post-Soviet countries and divided society into parts supporting Russia and supporting Ukraine.

The methodology of this study consists of mixed-method approach: a review of scientific literature, survey, and interview. During the review of scientific literature using methods of content analysis of secondary data (research papers, methodologies, models, recommendations, etc.), we analyzed the historical background, the nature of the influence of propaganda, strategies, and potential threats to the national identity of young people.

For the field study, a survey method was chosen, which is convenient for researching problems in the social sciences (Ray, 2007). A survey has been compiled that allows us to study propaganda in the structure of youth media consumption in practice, as well as its impact on the national identity of respondents. The research was conducted among 565 young residents of Kazakhstan regions bordering Russia (North Kazakhstan, Kostanay, Pavlodar regions) aged 18 to 35 years using a random sample, considering the socio-demographic composition. The survey was administered using the Google Forms platform, in both Kazakh and Russian languages, based on the preferences of the respondents.

According to the data of the National Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2021, these regions are characterized by high rates of the proportion of the population who do not speak the Kazakh language, which contributes to the widespread dissemination of Russian-language media in these regions. So, in Kostanay region 368 thousand people out of 776 thousand inhabitants do not speak Kazakh, in Pavlodar region - 244 thousand people out of 698 thousand inhabitants, in North Kazakhstan - 275 thousand people out of 507 thousand inhabitants (Bureau of National Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2021). These indicators range from 30 to 50% of the total number of residents of these regions who do not speak Kazakh and prefer Russian. The choice of these territories is also justified due to their geographical and cultural proximity to Russia, which makes these regions suitable for studying the influence of foreign media.

At the same time, the questions were divided into modules: socio-demographic characteristics defining the structure of media consumption; influence of foreign media on respondents' worldviews and political opinions; impact on respondents' sense on national belonging and well-being (Annex 1).

To complement the quantitative survey data, we conducted semi-structured expert interviews with nine specialists working directly with youth, media, and national identity issues. Experts were selected through purposive sampling, as they possess in-depth knowledge of the research topic: university professors in journalism from regional universities

studying youth media consumption, representatives of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan specializing in national identity and interethnic cultural preservation and representatives of Youth Resource Centers working directly with young people in the studied regions. We identified and contacted with 10 experts and 6 of them agreed to take part.

The expert interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, allowing for flexibility while ensuring that all key topics were covered. Each interview lasted between 30 and 60 minutes and was conducted online via Microsoft Teams. The interviews were recorded with the participants' consent, and additional written notes were taken to capture key insights. The discussions focused on several core themes, including trends in youth media consumption in border regions, the role of Russian and Kazakhstani media in shaping national identity, political and social attitudes influenced by media exposure, and recommendations for strengthening national identity and media literacy. These qualitative insights complemented the survey data, providing a more comprehensive understanding of how media consumption impacts the identity formation of young people in Kazakhstan's border regions.

Quantitative data from the survey was processed using descriptive statistical methods. Qualitative data from expert interviews was analyzed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), which involved coding responses, identifying key themes, and integrating them with survey findings.

4. Results

For analysis, it is important to consider the concept of national identity. National identity is a set of historical, cultural, political, and social elements that allow an individual to recognize himself as a part of a certain nation (Citrin et al., 2001). It is formed because of internal and external interaction, including the influence of mass media. Thus, understanding how young people in border regions perceive their identity under the influence of information flows is of particular importance for improving media policy and maintaining social stability in the country.

Having studied the scientific literature on the research topic, we have formulated conclusions about the model of the influence of foreign propaganda on the youth of border regions on the example of Russian case (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Model of the influence of foreign propaganda on the youth of border regions on the example of the Russian case

To check this model, a survey of young people from the border regions of Kazakhstan was conducted. In this case, we have chosen the issues of media consumption and perception of the war in Ukraine as markers of national identity. Social platforms (Facebook, Instagram, VKontakte), instant messengers (What’sApp, Telegram, etc.), news websites, television are the most common ways for respondents to receive news (Figure 2).




Figure 2. The most common sources of news among respondents

For a more detailed study of media consumption through social networks, we asked the question “How often do you use the following social networks and services?” and gave examples of global and Russian social networks. It was revealed that about 20% of respondents are active users of the social networks ‘VKontakte’ and ‘Odnoklassniki’, which confirms the influence of the Russian media campaign on young people.

The question “How closely do you follow the news in the world/ Kazakhstan/ Russia?” allowed us to determine the influence of the Russian media and the information agenda on the respondents (Table 1).

Table 1. Respondents’ attention to news and trust in information sources: world, Kazakhstan, and Russia

Answer option	How closely do you follow the news in					
	the world		Kazakhstan		Russia	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
Very carefully	56	9,9	75	13,3	46	8,1
Rather carefully	187	33,1	199	35,2	79	14,0
Not very carefully	228	40,4	186	32,9	190	33,6
I hardly follow it	78	13,8	87	15,4	229	40,5
I find it difficult to answer	16	2,8	18	3,2	21	3,7
TOTAL	565	100	565	100	565	100

Thus, it is noted that young people, in general, are rather inattentive to the news agenda, since only about 40% of respondents are very closely and rather closely following news in the world, Kazakhstan and Russia. The respondents follow the news in Kazakhstan most closely (48.5%), but 22.1% of respondents follow the news in Russia very closely and rather closely. The following statistics allow us to understand in detail which sources of information respondents consider the most objective: 27% of respondents trust foreign media more, 26.6% - Telegram channels, 20.8% - YouTube channels. Only 7.8% of respondents trust Russian TV channels. At the same time, many respondents (25.2%) found it difficult to answer this question, and 17.4% believe that there are no objective sources of information.

To study the influence of media consumption on the political views of respondents, which will more clearly allow us to feel the influence of foreign media on the respondents, we formulated the question “In your opinion, which of the following options most accurately describes what is happening in Ukraine?”. 53 respondents or 9.4% chose the answer option similar to the Russian media “Russia is conducting a special military operation against the Nazis in Ukraine”. Another option that coincides with the narratives of the Russian government was the statement “Russia is at war with Western countries and NATO on the territory of Ukraine”. 71 respondents or 12.6% chose him. 185 people hold the opposite point of view, that is, 32.7% believe that Russia is waging a war against Ukraine with the aim of its occupation and further annexation. At the same time, 45.3% or 256 respondents immediately found it difficult to answer. This question accurately demonstrates the influence of Russian patterns on the opinion and political views of young people, namely, 22% of respondents agree with the narratives broadcast in the Russian media. Many those who find it difficult to answer demonstrate unwillingness or fear of expressing their own political views. This response reflects the perception of conflict as multifactorial and complex. The largest group of respondents who find it difficult to answer indicates a significant level of uncertainty and, possibly, a lack of information or difficulty understanding the situation among people.

It is worth noting that the issue of identity in Kazakhstan escalated in September 2023, when partial military mobilization was announced in Russia. Then 837 thousand Russians who did not want to participate in the war came to Kazakhstan (UlyshMedia, 2024). We compared the respondents’ opinions about support for partial military mobilization

in Russia and the relocation of Russians to Kazakhstan (Table 2). The correlation between support for mobilization and relocation is clearly visible. That is, almost 1.5 times more respondents support the relocation of Russians to Kazakhstan than support mobilization. Although the reason for Russians moving to Kazakhstan in most cases is military mobilization when citizens do not want to take part in the war and leave their homeland to avoid conscription into the Russian army. According to statistics (Bureau of National Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024), 11,711 citizens of the Russian Federation arrived in Kazakhstan for permanent residence in 2023. It demonstrates that young people tend to be more tolerant of migration processes, but do not support Kazakhstan’s involvement in military operations.

Table 2. Correlation between partial military mobilization in Russia and relocation of Russians to Kazakhstan

Answer option	Do you support:			
	partial military mobilization in Russia?		relocation of Russians to Kazakhstan?	
	Number	%	Number	%
I support it	71	13,4	117	21,9
I don't support it	225	42,5	196	36,6
I do not care	74	14,0	88	16,4
I find it difficult to answer	87	16,4	103	13,6
I haven't heard anything about it	72	13,6	61	11,4
TOTAL	565	100	565	100

National identity encompasses not only self-categorization and normative content, but also affect, that is, “identification with” (Citrin et al., 2001). Affect includes, among other things, political preferences, and the desire to link their future with the country or place of their residence. In this regard, for a more permanent demonstration of the issue of national identity, respondents were offered a set of questions about trust in state, public institutions, and non-governmental organizations (Figure 3). The combination of the answers “I completely trust” and “rather I trust” allows us to summarize the information received in the form of a real result. Respondents trust the president of the country the most (61%), banks (60.6%), international organizations (61.4%). The respondents trust the least the Parliament (41.5%) and Kazakhstani mass media (39.7%).




Figure 3. Respondents’ trust in state institutions, public organizations, and non-governmental entities

To the question “How much do you like living in your region?” in the sum of the answer options “Very much” and “Rather like”, more than 80% of respondents respond positively. However, compared to the question “What do you think about moving out of your region?”, there is a correlation between positive and negative responses. In the sum of the options “I firmly intend to move from here”, “I will move if I have the opportunity”, 50.8% of respondents want to change their place of residence. At the same time, most of the respondents want to move to Astana or Almaty (37.4%), another city or region of Kazakhstan (10.8%), to Russia (10.1%), to far abroad (29.4%), 12.2% found it difficult to answer.

Thus, even if the respondents satisfied with their current place of residence, more than half of them still want to move. At the same time, 48.2% of them plan internal migration, and 39.5% want to leave Kazakhstan. The main reasons for the future relocation are socio-economic factors.

The results of the survey show us features of an identity crisis among the respondents. In particular, the desire to move is associated with uncertainty about the future, which violates the identity that requires complementarity of the past and the future.

This can also be confirmed by the frequent choice of the “I find it difficult to answer” option. From 30 to 45% of respondents answered some questions in this way. This is consistent with the concept of “confused identity” (Erikson, 1968), when individuals cannot clearly define their social and political role in a changing society.

Experts' opinions on the structure of media consumption by young people in the border regions of Kazakhstan varied depending on the age of the expert. For example, younger experts between the ages of 28 and 35 believe that the study group is apolitical and consumes more entertainment content, which is at the top of its popularity. They learn the news not from the media, but from social networks, which are often retold by popular bloggers and opinion leaders. The reason for the unpopularity of the official media, according to experts, is the boredom of the content and the abundance of negative information. Young people take care of their psychological health and prefer comfort. However, this type of media consumption can form stereotypes when public opinion is based not on facts, but on the subjective opinions of popular personalities. Among the topics, the main thing is how to make money, how to gain new knowledge, how to apply artificial intelligence and success stories of various personalities.

Older experts between the ages of 36 and 64 believe that young people still devote time to traditional media – they watch Kazakhstani humorous TV programs and popular talk shows. However, they watch it not only on the TV channels themselves, but also on the TV channel pages on the Internet. Also, in their opinion, social issues can be singled out among the popular topics of concern to the youth of the border regions.

Experts note the differences among the youth of Kostanay, Pavlodar and North Kazakhstan regions from other territories of Kazakhstan. It is expressing particularly in knowledge of two languages (Kazakh and Russian), but a greater preference for the Russian language. According to the PISA 2022 results (Ministry of Education of Kazakhstan, 2024), schools' students in the northern regions of Kazakhstan demonstrate higher rates of functional literacy. Experts also note the low involvement in the political agenda. However, engagement is not intrusive, through entertainment content, humor, music on social media, as well as through parents who consume a lot of political content themselves.

Experts believe that the media directly affects the perception of national identity among young people in the border regions. They have a high level of digital literacy but lack the skills to critically perceive content. One expert gives a vivid example when young people see the level of wealth in the United States and European countries on social media, and then compare it with their situation in Kazakhstan, this often changes the opinion of young people about their country and the policies pursued by the state. That is, for young people, the very concept of national identity is formed based on, among other things, economic indicators. In addition, experts believe that the study group identifies the country's government and society and cannot consider them separately. The low level of Kazakh language proficiency (in comparison with other regions of Kazakhstan) is becoming a problem for young people in the border regions. Experts call this one of the decisive factors in the manifestation of the identity crisis of these young people. After all, the state policy is currently reoriented towards the transformation of the Kazakh language as the language of interethnic communication among the citizens of the country (Tokayev, 2019). In addition, the policy of relocating residents of the southern regions to the border regions with the provision of broad social benefits, widely covered in the media, also has an impact. Some representatives of the youth of the border regions feel oppression in their small homeland.

5. Discussion

Based on the findings of the study, the results support the hypothesis that the youth in border regions exhibit significant consumption of foreign media content. This phenomenon appears to exert a notable influence on their national identity, potentially weakening their sense of belonging to their home nation while fostering a sense of affiliation with foreign cultural or national constructs. One in five respondents actively follows Russian news and uses Russian media platforms.

27% of respondents trust foreign media, and another 7.8% trust Russian TV channels. Thus, the youth of the border regions are more susceptible to foreign influence due to their wide accessibility and compliance with the linguistic preferences of the population. The use of social media as the main source of information indicates a shift in emphasis towards personalized and often fragmented channels of information, which can contribute to the formation of diverse or contradictory views.

Questions related to the perception of the war in Ukraine have permanently demonstrated the influence of foreign media on the consciousness of respondents. Even though 22% of respondents support the narratives of the Russian media, many those who found it difficult to answer (45.3%) indicate a high level of uncertainty and, possibly, fear of expressing their own opinion. This shows features of an identity crisis in which young people lack a clear understanding of their political and social roles (Erikson, 1968). This coincides with expert estimates, according to which young people prefer entertaining content to political discussions and often rely on bloggers and opinion leaders rather than trusted news sources.

Trust in government and public institutions also varies. The high level of trust in the President and international organizations contrasts with low trust in the media and parliament. This may indicate insufficiency of general confidence in systems ensuring social stability. The desire to migrate, even with high satisfaction with life in the region, highlights the uncertainty about the future. A significant number of respondents are planning to move due to socio-economic factors, which further indicates the blurring of national identity, especially in the context of attachment to their region or country. This confirms the conclusion from expert interviews that the concept of national identity among young people is increasingly associated with economic factors. Respondents, losing their ideological connection, move into another information field, their national identity is violated. This indicates not only economic motives, but also a sense of insufficient integration into the emerging national identity of Kazakhstan.

Considering these conclusions and based on the opinion of experts, it is possible to propose several recommendations for government agencies and public organizations aimed at strengthening national identity, increasing media literacy and resilience of young people in border regions to external information influences.

Government agencies need to:

1. Introduce compulsory media literacy courses in school and university curricula, especially in border regions;
2. Implement sensitive topics related to interethnic issues into the content of journalism education programs: terminology, hate speech, interethnic conflicts and tensions, etc.;
3. Organize grant programs to support creators of Kazakhstani youth content on YouTube, TikTok, Telegram, podcasts in Kazakh and youth initiatives aimed at popularizing Kazakh culture and history;
4. Develop measures to increase the economic attractiveness of the border regions (jobs, startup grants, tax incentives);
5. Strengthen the integration of youth into the socio-political life of the country through educational and leadership programs.

Public organizations need to:

1. Involve young people in discussing important social issues and putting forward socially significant initiatives, conduct discussion clubs and workshops on the analysis of news sources and propaganda;
2. Launch local projects to create high-quality content on social media and support regional journalism startups working with relevant youth topics;
3. Develop volunteer and cultural projects involving young people in the study of the history and traditions of Kazakhstan;
4. Establish cooperation with popular bloggers to promote national identity through digital content and organize workshops for influencers to teach them how to communicate information responsibly.

This research is of high practical importance, even considering the limited research resources. However, further expansion of the sample to other border regions, including those bordering China, may be useful. In this regard, as limitations of the study, we point to the prospect of including additional regions in subsequent studies to gain an even more comprehensive understanding of youth media consumption in Kazakhstan.

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Authors contributions

Bogdan Petrov and Aitmukhanbet Yesdauletov were responsible for study design and revising. Ainur Abiltayeva and Daiana Ibrayeva were responsible for data collection and processing. Bogdan Petrov analyzed the data, drafted the manuscript and Aitmukhanbet Yesdauletov revised it. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Data sharing statement

No additional data are available.

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Annex 1

Questionnaire structure

1. Questions of socio-demographic orientation

The language of the questionnaire; Sex; Age; Region of residence; Type of activity; Education; What language do you mostly communicate in at home?

2. Questions characterizing the structure of media consumption

What sources do you usually get news from?

How closely do you follow the news in Kazakhstan; Russia; in the world? (each category has been asked separately)

How often do you use social networks and services (separately: VKontakte, Telegram, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok, Odnoklassniki, Facebook)?

3. Questions to identify the influence of foreign media on the respondents' worldview and political views

Are you following the current situation in Ukraine?

In your opinion, which sources of information most objectively cover what is happening in Ukraine?

In your opinion, which of the following options most accurately describes what is happening in Ukraine?

Do you support partial military mobilization in Russia?

Do you support the relocation of Russians to Kazakhstan?

4. Questions to identify the impact of media consumption on the national well-being of respondents

How much do you trust the President of the country; Parliament; police; courts; religious organizations; banks; NGOs; international organizations; Kazakhstani media (each category has been asked separately)?

How much do you like living in your region?

What do you think about moving out of your residence place?

If you want to move, where exactly? Reasons for moving